University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 15
Number 1 Symposium — Gun Control and the
Second Amendment

Article 6

10-1-1989

Kelly v. R.G. Industries: A Cause of Action for Assault Weapons
Joshua M. Horwitz

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Horwitz, Joshua M. (1989) "Kelly v. R.G. Industries: A Cause of Action for Assault Weapons," University of
Dayton Law Review: Vol. 15: No. 1, Article 6.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss1/6

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

KELLEY v. R.G. INDUSTRIES: A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR ASSAULT WEAPONS
Joshua M. Horwitz*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.,' the Maryland Court of Appeals
found, inter alia, that manufacturers and marketers of "Saturday
Night Specials" should be held strictly liable "to innocent persons who
suffer gunshot injuries from the criminal use of their products."' The
Maryland Court of Appeals was the first court in the country to recognize this cause of action.' Refusing to extend the traditional theories of
strict liability, the court fashioned a new cause of action. This note
discusses the cause of action recognized in the Kelley case, and argues
that it should be applied to marketers and manufacturers of semi-automatic assault weapons when their products injure an innocent person
during the course of a crime.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

In Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.,4 the plaintiff, Olen J.Kelley was

shot during the armed robbery of a grocery store where he was employed. 5 The unidentified robber, used a Rohm Revolver Handgun assembled and sold by R.G. Industries, Inc." Kelley, joined by his wife,
filed a lawsuit against defendants Rohm and R.G. Industries, Inc. in
* Legal Director of Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, a Project of the Educational Fund
to End Handgun Violence. B.A., University of Michigan, 1985; J.D., George Washington University, 1988.
1. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985). Kelly was legislatively overridden by MD. ANN.
CODE art. 3A, § 36-1(h) (1988 Supp).
2. Kelley, 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159. Factors that define a "Saturday Night Special" include: "the gun's barrel length, concealability, cost, quality of materials, quality of manufacturer, accuracy, reliability, whether it has been banned from import by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, and other related characteristics." Id. at 145-46, 497 A.2d at 1153-54.
3. Id. at 156, 497 A.2d at 1159.
4. Id. at 124, 497 A.2d at 1143.
5. Id. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1144.
6. Id. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1145. The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 925 (1983)
provides that handguns that do not meet criteria for importation as promulgated by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and firearms (BATF) be denied importation. Id. at § 925(d)(3) However, the
law provides that the parts to handguns that are denied importation can be imported and assembled in the United States. Id. Rohm Gesellschaft is a German firearms manufacturer that imports parts to handguns denied importation as a whole. Riordan, Gun was made here, but sale is
outlawed, The Miami Herald, Apr. 1, 1981, at 7, col. 1.The parts are then assembled by R.G.
Industries in the United States.

Published by eCommons, 1989

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15:1

the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland.' The Plaintiffs

alleged four causes of action: (1) strict liability for an abnormally dangerous product; (2) strict liability for defective marketing, promotion,
distribution, and design making the handgun unreasonably dangerous;
(3) negligence; and (4) loss of consortium. 8 R.G. Industries, Inc. re-

moved the action to the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland. 9 By stipulation, the parties dismissed R.G. Industries, Inc.
from the case without prejudice."
Rohm then moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a cause
of action.1" In support of its motion Rohm stated: "the [p]laintiffs' contentions [must] fail because the handgun performed as it was supposed
to perform and because Rohm Gesellschaft is not responsible for the
criminal and tortious acts of Mr. Kelley's assailant."' 2 Finding no controlling precedent in Maryland law, the United State District Court for
the District of Maryland certified three questions to the Maryland
Court of Appeals.'" Although there were some problems framing the
questions properly,"' the court of appeals finally settled on these three

7. Kelley, 304 Md. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Rohm made this motion pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
12. Kelly, 304 Md. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145.
13. Id.
14. The United States District Court originally certified the following questions to the Maryland Court of Appeals:
Question I
Is a handgun, which inflicts injury as the norm, rather than the exception, a defective
or unreasonably dangerous product?
Question 2
Is the marketing of handguns an abnormally dangerous activity?
(a) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine extend to instances in which the
alleged tortfeasor is not an occupier of land?
(b) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine apply where harm is brought
about by some third person or persons over whom the tortfeasor has no control?
Id. at 129-30, 497 A.2d at 1145. After oral argument, the plaintiffs asked that a new order of
certification be issued that better addressed matters raised at that hearing. Id. The United States
District Court withdrew the original order and substituted the following four questions through a
Further Order of Certification:
Question I
Is a handgun, which inflicts injury as the norm, rather than the exception, a defective
or unreasonably dangerous product? If the answer to question to one is "No," then
Question 2
Is a Rohm Handgun Revolver Model RG38S, which inflicts injury as the norm, rather
than the exception, a defective or unreasonably dangerous product?
Question 3
Is the marketing of Handguns an abnormally dangerous activity? In answering this
question, it may be that the Court of Appeals may desire to address itself to the following
sub-questions:
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issues:
(1) Is the manufacturer or marketer of a handgun, in general, liable
under any strict liability theory to a person injured as a result of the
criminal use of its product?
(2) Is the manufacturer or marketer of a particular category of small,
cheap handguns, sometimes referred to as "Saturday Night Specials,"
and regularly used in criminal activity, strictly liable to a person injured
by such a handgun during the course of a crime?
(3) Does the Rohm Revolver Handgun Model RG38S, serial number
0152662, fall within the category referred to in question 2?' 5

Kelley argued that under either the abnormally dangerous activity
doctrine stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 519-20,11 or
under the abnormally dangerous products doctrine stated in Restate-

ment (Second) of Torts section 402A, 17 the answers to questions one
and two were in the affirmative. The court disagreed and held that
"neither of these doctrines, nor any other previously recognized strict

liability principles, could properly be applied to hold, in general, the

manufacturer or marketer of a handgun liable to a person injured by
the handgun during the course of a crime."' 8
III.
A.

CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF LIABILITY

Do

NOT APPLY

Abnormally Dangerous Activity Doctrine

Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 519-209 delineate a num-

(a) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine extend to instances in which the
alleged tortfeasor is not an occupier of land?
(b) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine apply where harm is brought
about by some third person or persons over whom the tortfeasor had no control?
If the answer to question 3 is "No," then
Question 4
Is the marketing of the Rohm Revolver Handgun Model RG38S an abnormally dangerous activity? In answering this question the Court of Appeals of Maryland may desire
to address the following sub-questions:
(a) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine extend to instances in which the
alleged tortfeasor is not an occupier of land?
(b) Does the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine apply where harm is brought
about by some third person or persons over whom the tortfeasor had no control?
Id. at 130-31, 497 A.2d at 1145-46. The further order of certification clarified that the Maryland
Court of Appeals was not to be limited by the phrasing of the certified questions. Id.
15. Id. at 131, 497 A.2d at 1146.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1977).
17. Id. § 402A.
18. Kelley, 304 Md. at 132, 497 A.2d at 1146.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1977). Section 519 states:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to
the person, land or chattels of another, resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent harm.
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ber of factors under which a person may be held strictly liable in tort
for abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous activities. Liability may
be imposed even where the person is not negligent and has taken every
precaution to prevent damage to the victim." Maryland law, however,
has never permitted liability to attach, under this doctrine, to activities
not connected to the use of land by the owner or occupier. 2 1 "The
thrust of the doctrine is that the activity be abnormally dangerous in
relation to the area where it occurs. . . The dangers inherent in the
use of a handgun in the commission of a crime, on the other hand, bear

no relation to any occupation or ownership of land. ' ' 22 The court was

not willing to extend the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to an
activity such as the manufacturing or marketing of a handgun that was
not intimately connected to land. Thus, the defendant was not liable
under the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine.
B.

Abnormally Dangerous Product Doctrine

The second argument in Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., n was that
the defendant was liable under the abnormally dangerous product doctrine set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A."4 Under

(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the
activity abnormally dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520
states:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be
considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519. Examples of ultra hazardous activity
include: Blasting with explosives; fumigating with deadly poison; crop dusting; testing rocket motors; and use of blow torch on waste oil tankers. Activities not ultra hazardous include: impounding water; aviation; and excavation and earth moving. See 6 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 1232-39 (1988).
21. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 133, 497 A.2d at 1143 (citing Yommer v.
McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969)); Toy v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 176 Md.
197, 4 A.2d 757 (1939); Kirby v. Hylton, 51 Md. App. 365, 443 A.2d 640 (1982)).
22. 304 Md. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147; accord Addison v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 220, 223
(La. Ct. App. 1989); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
23. 304 Md. at 124, 497 A.2d at 1143.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) states:
(1)One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or his property, if
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this cause of action, adopted by Maryland in Phipps v. General Motors
Corp.,25 a plaintiff can prevail if the product, inter alia, was defective

and unreasonably dangerous to consumers.2

Maryland law provides

two ways to prove that a product is defective. 2 According to the Kelley
court, however, neither method was available to the plaintiffs. 8
One method of proving the existence of a defect in a product design or a manufacturing defect is the "consumer expectation test."
Under this test, a product is unreasonably dangerous if it is more dangerous than would be expected by the ordinary consumer.2 9 The court

in Kelley held that the defendant could not be held liable under this

theory because a consumer would expect a handgun to expel a projec-

tile with deadly force. Thus, simply because a handgun is dangerous
does not make it defective under the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A.1°
Another less accepted method of proving a product defect is the
"risk/utility" test recognized in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,
Inc."1
Under the risk/utility test:
[a] product may alternatively be found defective in design if the plaintiff
demonstrates that the product's design proximately caused his injury and
the defendant fails to establish, in light of the relevant factors, that on
balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in such a design.32
Although there is some authority in Maryland that would have
allowed the Kelley court to apply the risk/utility test,33 it refused to do

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) the rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not brought the. product from or entered into any contractual relations with the seller.
25. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
26. Kelley, 304 Md. at 135, 497 A.2d at 1148.
27. The Kelley Court explained that in Phipps they explicitly recognized the consumer expectation test as a method of proving a product defect. Id. The court also acknowledged that it
had never expressly accepted the risk/utility test, but that, "we did state in Phipps that 'in some
circumstances the question of whether a particular design is defective may depend upon a balancing of the utility of the design and other factors against the magnitude of the risk.'" Id. at
137-38, 497 A.2d at 1149 (quoting Phipps, 278 Md. at 348, 363 A.2d at 966).
28. Id. at 136-38, 497 A.2d at 1148-49.
29. Id. at 135, 497 A.2d at 1148; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. Kelley, 304 Md. at 136, 497 A.2d at 1148.
31. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
32. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
33. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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so. The court held that the risk/utility test only applies when something goes wrong with a product. The discharge of a handgun is supposed to inflict bodily injury. "Therefore, the risk/utility test cannot be
extended to impose liability on the maker or marketer of a handgun
which has not malfunctioned." 4

IV.

A

NEW CAUSE OF ACTION

While holding that the two traditional theories of strict liability
were inapplicable, the court in Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.,3 5 invoked
3
its common law powers to create a new cause of action. The court
held that "manufacturers and marketers of Saturday Night Special
handguns [are] strictly liable to innocent persons who suffer gunshot
injuries from the criminal use of their products.""1 The court generally
characterized Saturday Night Specials as those handguns that have
short barrels, are light weight, easily concealable, low in cost, made of
cheap materials, poorly manufactured, and inaccurate and unreliable. 8
The Kelley court based the new cause of action on three criteria:
(1) the risk of the product to society outweighs its utility to society; (2)
the foreseeability or knowledge by the maker or seller that the product
degree
is principally to be used in criminal activity; and (3) the relative
39
victim.
innocent
the
and
seller
or
maker
the
between
fault
of
The first element of the test was decided in Kelley's favor. The
court looked to the laws of both the United States and Maryland and
concluded that weapons known as Saturday Night Specials were distinguishable from other handguns because as a class they are more of a
risk to society than a benefit."'
The second element of the test, foreseeability, also was determined
by the court to militate for liability. The court held that a "manufacturer or marketer of a Saturday Night Special knows or ought to know
that he is making or selling a product principally used in criminal activity."4' 1 It was the defendant's knowledge of the harm produced by

34. Kelley, 304 Md. at 138, 497 A.2d at 1149.
35. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
36. Id. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 145-46, 497 A.2d at 1153-54.
39. Id. at 155-57, 497 A.2d at 1158-59.
40. Id. at 147-54, 497 A.2d at 1154-58. The court relied on a number of statutes and
legislative reports to determine that public policy indicated that Saturday Night Specials were
more detrimental to society than beneficial. They included: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. § 921 (1968); S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 76-80, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2164-67; 118 CONG. REC. 27030 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh, Subcommittee Chairman); and H.R. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 9, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4415.
41. Kelley, 304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158. The court based this finding on statements
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these weapons that was considered to be unreasonable. 42 Thus, the defendant was culpable because it had knowledge of the predictable and

probable criminal use of its product.
Additionally, the Kelley court found that as between a totally innocent victim and the marketer or manufacturer that makes a product
available to the public that will be used most commonly in criminal
activity, the latter is more at fault.43 Because all three factors weighed
towards liability, the court held that if the Rohm handgun in question
was a Saturday Night Special, 4 liability should be imposed on the
manufacturer and the marketer. 5
V.

ANALYSIS

The decision in Kelley v. R.G.. Industries, Inc.," created a framework for establishing liability against the makers and sellers of cheap,
easily concealable handguns that injure innocent victims during the
course of a crime. There has been discussion of Kelley in other cases."7
Many of these cases have been critical of the Kelley court. Whether or
not there is merit to the criticism as it applies to handguns, the cause of
action is particularly well suited to holding manufacturers and marketers of semi-automatic assault weapons liable to innocent persons injured by these weapons during the course of a crime.
A.

What Is An Assault Weapon?

Assault weapons became a national issue following the January
17, 1989, massacre at a Stockton, California schoolyard in which 29
children were injured and five killed by a gunman with an AK-47."

made by an R.G. Industries salesman, as chronicled in Brill, The Traffic (Legal and Illegal) in
Guns, HARPERS, Sept. 1977, at 40.
42. Kelley. 304 Md. at 156, 497 A.2d at 1159. For a discussion of the basis of foreseeability
as a criterion for liability, see Iveson, Manufacturers Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A
Common Law Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771 (1983).
43. Kelley, 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159. For a discussion of the equities between the
innocent injured party and the manufacturer or marketer, see Bonney, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Handgun Injuries: An Economic Analysis, 73 GEo. L.J. 1437, 1463 n.167 (1985).
44. The Kelley court determined that as a matter of law the plaintiff in this type of action
must first show that the handgun in question possesses sufficient attributes of a Saturday Night
Special before allowing the trier of a fact to make the final determination. Kelley, 304 Md. at
158, 497 A.2d at 1160.
45. Id.
46. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
47. See, e.g., Caveny v. Raven Arms, Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 533 (S.D. Ohio 1987), affd,
849 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1988); Armijo v. Ex Cam Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D.N.M. 1987);
Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 761-62 (D.C. 1989); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d
751, 756-57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry and Loan, Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267,
748 P.2d 661, 665 (1988).
48. Statement by Janet Gengs, Coalition to Stop Gun Violence Press Conference (Jan. 17,
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During the past year there has been much debate about the definition
of assault weapons.4 9 Much of this debate appears to have been calculated by firearms industry forces to obscure the important issue of how
to keep these most deadly and dangerous weapons off the street. After
the public outcry following the massacre, industry and "pro-gun"
forces attempted to halt legislation banning assault weapons by asserting that "assault weapons" cannot be specifically defined." Considering
that the AK-47 used in the Stockton massacre fired 106 rounds of ammunition in under two minutes,5 1 it is clear that the weapon is in a
weapons are
different class than the average sporting rifle. Assault 52
"designed for one purpose only-to efficiently kill people."
For years the firearms press had clearly defined these weapons."
Moreover, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) defined assault rifles" for the purpose of prohibiting foreign importation
of these weapons in compliance with Title 18 United States Code section 925(d)(3).1 5 The BATF Report set forth criteria identifying assault rifles by the following attributes: (1) military appearance; 56 (2)
large magazine capacity; 57 (3) semiautomatic version of a

1990) [hereinafter Gengs statement] (Gengs is a teacher who was wounded in the Stockton, California attack).
49. See Testimony of Darrel W. Stephens, Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum, Remarks before the United States House Of Representatives' Select Committee
On Narcotics Abuse And Control: Assault Weapons and Drug Enforcement (Nov. 1,1989) [hereinafter Stephens Testimony].
50. Interview with Jeff Muchnick, Legislative Director of the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence (Jan. 25, 1990).
51. Gengs Statement, supra note 48.
52. Stephens Testimony, supra note 49.
53. There is a publication called The Shooter's Bible, which had a separate section on
paramilitary weapons that included a picture of almost all of the assault weapons under current
debate. 78 SHOOTER'S BIBLE 342-56 (1987). Interestingly, the 1990 edition of The Shooter's Bible has deleted the paramilitary chapter and dispersed the weapons through other chapters of the
book. 81 SHOOTERS BIBLE 1 (1990); see also THE GUN DIGEST BOOK OF ASSAULT WEAPONS
(1986).
54. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE ATF WORKING GROUP ON THE IMPORTABILITY OF CERTAIN SEMIAUTOMATIC RIFLES
(1989) [hereinafter BATF REPORT]. BATF only has the power to ban importation of weapons. 18
U.S.C. § 925(d) (1988). BATF does not, generally, have the statutory authority to remove domestically produced weapons from sale in the United States. Id.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3) (1988). Weapons can only be imported under 18 U.S.C. §
925(d)(3) if they are of a type "generally recognized as particularly suitable for or readily adaptable to sporting purposes." Id.
56. BATF REPORT, supra note 54, at 6-8. Features determined to give a weapon a military
configuration include: (1)ability to accept a detachable magazine; (2) folding/telescoping stocks;
(3) pistol grips; (4) ability to accept a bayonet (as to this category the working group stated "we
know of no traditional sporting application for a bayonet."); (5) flash suppressor; (6) bipods; (7)
grenade launcher; and (8) night sights. Id.
57. Id. The weapon that was used in the Stockton, California incident fired 106 rounds in
under two minutes. Gengs Statement, supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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machinegun.58 Once identified, each weapon was examined for its over-

all "sporting purpose" 5 as required under the statute.6 0 The BATF Report found that 43 weapons failed the "sporting purpose" test and were
denied importation to the United States. l These foreign rifles, similarly configured domestic rifles and similarly configured pistols are
what this article refers to as "assault weapons."
B.

Application of the Kelley Factors To Assault Weapons

1. Risk/Utility
The court in Kelley held the manufacturers and marketers of Saturday Night Specials liable, in part, because the societal risk of these
weapons outweighed their utility. 2 Similarly, strong evidence of the
lack of utility of assault weapons is their failure to pass the sporting
purpose test of Title 18 of the United States Code section 925 (d)(3).13
Sales of these weapons reflect intended use outside the traditional
sporting application. Since assault weapons are anti-personnel and
designed to be used as offensive weapons, one of their most obvious
non-sporting applications is in the criminal arena. 4
The Atlanta-Journal Constitution undertook to quantify the criminal use of assault weapons through data compiled by the BATF. 5 The

58. BATF REPORT, supra note 54, at 8. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIRENEWS 3 (1989) ("The semiautomatic assault rifles in question represent a distinct type of
rifle characterized by certain military features which distinguish them from the traditional sporting rifle.").
59. "Sporting purpose" refers to the traditional shooting sports of target shooting, skeet and
trap shooting, and hunting. The report also addressed the activity known as plinking or "shooting
at randomly selected targets such as bottles and cans" and determined that the activity was a
pastime and not a sport. BATF REPORT, supra note 54, at 10-1I.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 925(d). The BATF Report omitted discussion of foreign assault weapons in
a pistol configuration. Bills pending in the United States House of Representatives and the Senate,
at the time this article was written, apply the BATF Report criteria to pistol and rifle configuration regardless of country of origin. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
61. BATF REPORT, supra note 54, at 15-17.
62. Kelley, 304 Md. at 155-57, 497 A.2d at 1158-59.
63. BATF REPORT, supra note 54, at 15-17. The domestic equivalent of the weapons prohibited from importation have not been removed from the United States market as of the date of
this article. Failure to ban assault weapons made in the United States is not a reflection on their
utility but rather on the political will of the Bush administration.
64. See Maryland Panel Approves More Gun Sales, The Wash. Post, Jan. 9, 1990, at 1,
col. I (statement of Matt Fenton concerning the Intrate Tec-9 assault weapon); Inexpensive Tec-9
Top Assault Weapon, Daytona Beach Sunday News-Journal, May 21, 1989, at A-10, col. .; see
also BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, BATF PRESS RELEASE No. 1 (1989) ("The
study was undertaken because of the dramatic increase in the number of these [assault rifles]
weapons being imported and police reports of their use in violent crime."); Anti-Gun Michigan
Cops Stage Semi-Auto Demo. GUN WEEK, Jan. 19, 1990, at 10 ("Elizabeth Welton, supervisor of
the Michigan State Police's firearms record division, claimed that the number of assault weapons
confiscated in drug raids and other arrests doubled from 900 in 1987 to 1,800 in 1988.").
65. Stewart & Alexander, Assault Guns Muscling In On The Front Lines Of Crime, AtARMS
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study reviewed 42,758 trace requests 68 submitted to the BATF from
the period January 1, 1988 through March 27, 1988.67 The study found
that:
While assault guns account for just 1 million-or 0.5 percent-of the 200
million privately owned firearms in the United States, they were used in
one of every 10 crimes that resulted in a firearms trace. .

.

. The find-

ings appear to document for the first time what police across the nation
have asserted for months-that a minute number of semi-automatic guns
patterned after military firearms are the favored weapon of a growing
especially violence-prone drug gangs which infest
number of criminals,
68
larger U.S. cities.

In light of this study and the other reports, 9 it seems that assault
weapons, due to their high propensity for use in crime, balanced
against their lack of sporting purpose, are more of a danger to society
than a benefit.
2.

Foreseeability

In Kelley, the court determined that the manufacturer or marketer that has knowledge of the potential harm of its product can be
held liable.7" In applying the Kelley analysis to assault weapons, the
maker or seller should be able to foresee that its product's main use is
for criminal activity. There is a core group of weapons that have been
unequivocally identified as assault weapons. This group includes the
AK-47, Uzi, Baretta Ar-70, Colt AR-15 and CAR-15, FN/FAL, FN/
LAR and FNC, MAC-10 and MAC-1i, Steyr AUG, INTRATEC
TEC-9, and the Street Sweeper and Striker 12.71 Manufacturers that

lanta J. Const., May 21, 1989, at A-I, col. 1.
66. Id. The BATF is the federal agency responsible for identifying the origin of weapons
confiscated by local law enforcement. A trace request is the method local law enforcement uses to
ask the BATF to investigate a particular weapon.
67. Id.
68. Stewart & Alexander, supra note 65, at A-2; see also Statement of William Pattison,
Executive Vice President of the National Association of Police Organizations, Remarks before the
United States Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution (Feb. 10, 1989) ("The availability of,
and access to, assault weapons by criminals has become so substantial that police forces are being
forced to upgrade the weapons supplied to police officers merely as a matter of self-defense and
self-preservation."); Stephens Testimony, supra note 49, at I ("Their [Police Executive Research
Forum members] regular encounters with the corrosive effects of drug abuse have become more
dangerous, because drug traffickers and abusers have turned to semiautomatic assault guns as
their weapons of choice.").
69. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
70. Kelley, 304 Md. at 155-56, 497 A.2d at 1158-59.
71. This list of assault weapons is identified in S. 747, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The
bill is being sponsored by Senator DeConcini before congress at the time this article was written.
The list of weapons is considered the least inclusive of all bills currently proposed. The list only
includes weapons -unequivocally defined as assault weapons. Additionally, the foreign manufac-
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now make or market these weapons or other substantially similar weapons have constructive notice through their inclusion in proposed legislation, that their weapons have been identified as having a high risk of
criminal use. A manufacturer consistently identified as a maker of assault weapons cannot claim ignorance of its product's classification as
an assault weapon and its foreseeable use. Thus, manufacturers and
marketers of identified assault weapons should be deemed to have, at
the very least, constructive knowledge of the weapon's lack of social
utility.
3. Fault
As discussed above, manufacturers and sellers of assault weapons
can no longer profess ignorance or dismay that these weapons have a
strong probability of criminal use. These weapons have been identified
by state and federal legislatures and the BATF to be in a special class.
One who now willfully makes or sells an assault weapon must know
that there exists a strong chance of criminal use. Therefore, as between
the merchant making a profit on the weapon and an innocent person,
not even a party to the sale of the weapon, the merchant is clearly
more at fault."2
C. Potential Criticisms
During the remainder of this note, the author will examine the
criticisms of the Kelley decision as it applies to assault weapons. The
subsections below illustrate why the Kelley cause of action, as applied
to assault weapons, should be particularly insulated from these
criticisms.
1. Legislative Function
A number of sources accused the Kelley court of usurping the legislative function. 73 It is likely that this criticism would be leveled at a
tured weapons on the list are also included in the BATF Report. BATF REPORT, supra note 54, at
1-2. Finally, H.R. 1190, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) and S. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
include the list of weapons of S. 747 in their definition of assault weapons.
72. See Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (Prewitt, J.,
dissenting) ("A manufacturer who placed such a product among the public 'is certainly more at
fault' than the innocent victim. . . . [Imposing liability] would allow the victims to recover from
those that profit knowing that those profits are earned at the risk and expense of the innocent.")
(quoting Kelley, 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159).
73. See Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 535 (S.D. Ohio 1987) ("Legislatures, in contrast to courts, can consider all the competing policy interests as well as the public
will."); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry and Loan, Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 271, 748 P.2d 661, 665
(1988) ("[E]stablishing a new cause of action regarding handguns is properly the domain of the
legislature."). But see Note, Kelley v. R.G. Industries: When Hard Cases Make Good Law, 46
MD. L. REV. 486, 493 (1987).
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court that recognized a cause of action for assault weapons as well.
However, the Kelley court did address this issue by indicating that the
common law has the flexibility to adopt a cause of action to fit the
needs of society. 74 Indeed, the court pointed out many instances where
common law courts have recognized a new cause of action. 75 Adopting
new causes of action is not an anomaly to Maryland, since other state
common law courts have done so routinely.76 In fact, common law
courts have time and time again extended the scope of products liability by adopting new causes of action and accepting new doctrines. 77 If a
cause of action does not abrogate a legislative scheme, courts, relying
on their common law traditions, should be able to adopt it. Thus, the
judiciary will be able to better reflect society's realities and demands.7 8
2.

Cost Will Not Be A Determinative Factor For Liability

Courts have criticized the Kelley opinion because a factor in finding manufacturers and marketers of Saturday Night Specials liable
was the low cost of this class of guns. Basing liability on cost, it is
argued, would discriminate against low income purchasers. 79
This writer proposes that all assault weapons, not just inexpensive
and poorly made ones, should be subject to the Kelley cause of action.
Hence, a duty would be imposed not by the price and quality of the
weapons, but rather through the design. Manufacturers and marketers

74. Kelley, 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d. at 1159.
75. Id. at 140-41, 497 A.2d at 1150-51 (citing Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d
506 (1983)); Moxley v. Acker, 294 Md. 47, 447 A.2d 857 (1982); Adler v. American Standard
Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978);
Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977).
76. E.g., Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974) (where the
Virginia Supreme Court held that a cause of action existed for infliction of emotional distress even
in the absence of physical injury). The holding in Womack represents a court fashioning a cause
of action to meet society's needs. The Kelley court met a similar demand and should not be
criticized for doing so.
77. See Barker v. Lull Engineering, Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963) (first court in country to recognize cause of action under Restatement (Second) of Torts §
402A.); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
78. Kelley, 304 Md. at 141, 497 A.2d at 1151.
79. See Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 534 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 849
F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1988); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 775 (D.N.M. 1987)
("[Cilaims against gun manufacturers will have the anomalous result that only persons shot with
cheap guns will be able to recover, while those shot with expensive guns, admitted by the Kelley
court to be more accurate and therefore deadlier, would take nothing."); Delahanty v. Hinckley,
564 A.2d 758, 762 (D.C. 1989); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987). Although the Delahanty court relied on the logic proposed in Armijo, the argument does
not seem suited for the District of Columbia because under District of Columbia law no one,
regardless of economic status, can legally purchase a gun. Hence, the cause of action in Kelley
would not discriminate against low income purchasers because no legal purchasers exist in the
District of Columbia.
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that make and sell weapons that fall into the design category of assault
weapons, well made or poorly made, cheap or expensive, will all have
the same burden. Thus, unequal treatment based on economic status,
as an argument against liability, is removed.
3. Assault Weapons Are Readily Definable
In criticizing the Kelley decision, the court in Delahanty v. Hinckley"0 indicated that justifying liability for manufacturers and marketers
of such a vaguely defined class of weapon as the Saturday Night Special is problematic.81 Manufacturers, the Delahanty court opined,
would not know if their weapons fell into the category of Saturday
Night Specials. However, assault weapons can be defined with more
precision. As discussed earlier, assault rifles have been defined by the
consensus of laws and reports.8"
The criteria for assault weapons has been framed. Although the
manufacturer or the marketer may disagree with the breadth of the
criteria there is no denying that these criteria are now accepted.
Merchants may choose to continue the sale and manufacture of these
weapons. However, in defense of a liability suit, manufacturers and
marketers can not convincingly argue that due to the vagueness of the
definition they did not know they were dealing in assault weapons. Fair
notice of the definition has been given.83
4.

Social Utility Is Not The Only Factor Determinative Of Liability

In, Richardson v. Holland,8 4 the court criticized the Kelley decision because the result of such a theory,
is to fasten strict liability upon the manufacturer and vendor of a lawful
product because it is determined by an appellate court that the misuse of
such a product outweighed its social value. If accepted, that doctrine can
be applied to many products such as whiskey, fuzz busters, all-terrain
vehicles and overpowered automobiles.85
Clearly, however, the Kelley court indicated that there are other factors besides social utility to consider. The second and third prongs of
the Kelley test include knowledge and relative degree of fault. 86 As the
dissent in Richardson illuminated:

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

564 A.2d 758 (D.C. 1989).
Id. at 762.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See generally BATF REPORT, supra note 54.
741 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 756.
Kelley, 304 Md. at 155-57, 497 A.2d at 1158-59.
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The basis of Kelley is almost the sure knowledge of those who sell Saturday Night Specials "that the chief use of the product is for criminal
activity"...... Many products such as alcohol, firearms and automobiles

are often misused, but they are not designed and sold knowing that the
majority of instances of use will be improper .

. .

. [TIhe handgun used

to shoot plaintiff had little, if any legitimate use, and a probable illegal
use. Seeking to profit by helping create such an activity should also create responsibility for the damages caused. A holding of potential liability
here creates no danger to manufacturers or distributors of products
which are legitimate but subject to improper use.87
The Richardson dissent highlights that knowledge of a product's illegitimate purpose is a crucial factor in assessing liability through the Kelley cause of action.
Adopting the logic in the Richardson dissent, an even stronger argument can be made for assault weapon liability than for Saturday
Night Special liability. The lack of legitimate purpose for assault
weapons has been explained above. 8 Moreover, their use in criminal
activity is 20 times in excess of their numbers in the general firearms
population. 9 The knowledge of this lack of societal value, not the lack
of value by itself, coupled with the total non-culpability of the innocent
victim, is the essence of the Kelley cause of action.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article argues that manufacturers and marketers of assault
weapons should be held to a strict liability standard by those innocent
persons who are injured by the criminal use of their weapons. Liability
should be fashioned on the three criteria of Kelley v. R.G. Industries,
Inc.9" These criteria are that: (1) assault weapons are more of a risk to
society than a benefit; (2) the manufacturers and marketers have
knowledge of this risk; and (3) between the innocent victim and the
merchant profiting from the sale of such a product the merchant is
more at fault.9
The Kelley case found manufacturers and marketers of weapons
known as Saturday Night Specials strictly liable to innocent persons
injured through the criminal use of these weapons. Although the Kelley

87.
156, 497
88.
89.
90.
91.

Richardson, 741 S.W.2d at 757 (Prewitt, J., dissenting) (quoting Kelley, 304 Md. at
A.2d at 1159).
See generally BATF REPORT, supra note 54.
Stewart & Alexander, supra note 65, at A-1, col. 2.
304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
Id. at 155-57, 497 A.2d at 1158-59.
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case has been often criticized, the theory recognized by the court is
well suited to impose strict liability on manufacturers and marketers of
assault weapons.
Editor's Note:
The published version of this article did not incorporate specific
revisions submitted by the author. Because some of these revisions are
vital to an accurate understanding of his thesis, we are publishing herewith the major substantive revisions to his article, with our apologies to
Mr. Horwitz. These revisions are as follows:
Page 125, footnote 6:
6. Id. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1145. The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 925
(1983) provides that firearms that are not generally recognized as particularly suitable for
or readily adaptable to sporting purposes be denied importation. Id. § 925(d)(3). However,
until 1986 the law provided that the parts to handguns that were denied importation could
be assembled in the United States. Id. Rohm Gesellschaft is a German firearms manufacturer that imports parts to handguns denied importation as a whole. Riordan, Gun Was
Made Here, but Sale Is Outlawed, The Miami Herald, Apr. 1, 1981, at 7, col. 1. The parts
were then assembled by R.G. Industries in the United States.

Page 133, footnote 63:
63. BATF REPORT, supra note 54, at 15-17. Since the BATF has no jurisdiction over
weapons made in the United States, the domestic equivalent of the weapons prohibited
from importation have not been removed from the United States market as of the date of
this article.

Page 134, footnote 71:
71. This list of assault weapons is identified in S. 747, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135
REC. S3634 (1989). The bill is being sponsored by Senator Dennis DeConcini and
was before Congress at the time this article was written. The list of weapons is considered
the least inclusive of all bills currently proposed. The list includes only weapons unequivocally defined as assault weapons. A bill to be considered by the full House, H.R. 4225,
sponsored by Representative Bill Hughes, would extend the sporting purposes test to the
domestic assault weapons included in S. 747, among others, and ban their production. See
H.R. 4225, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). Additionally, the foreign manufactured weapons
in S. 747 are also included in the BATF Report. BATF REPORT, supra note 54, at 1-2.
Finally, H.R. 1190, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) and S. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135
CONG. REC. S1361 (1989) included the list of weapons of S. 747 in their definition of
assault weapons. On the state level both California and New Jersey have passed bans on
assault weapons that include all the weapons in S. 747. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1227512276.5 (West Supp. 1990); 1990 N.J. Laws 32.
CONG.
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